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Many human cognitive capacities are rendered possible by enculturation in com-
bination with specific neuronal and bodily dispositions. Acknowledgment of this is
of vital importance for a better understanding of the conditions under which soph-
isticated cognitive processing routines could have emerged on both phylogenetic
and ontogenetic timescales. Subscribing to enculturation as a guiding principle for
the development of genuinely human cognitive capacities means providing a de-
scription of the socio-culturally developed surrounding conditions and the pro-
found neuronal and bodily changes occurring as a result of an individual’s ongo-
ing interaction with its cognitive niche. In this commentary, I suggest that the pre-
dictive processing framework can refine and enrich important assumptions made
by the theory of cognitive integration and the associated approach to enculturated
cognition. I will justify this suggestion by considering several aspects that support
the complementarity of these two frameworks on conceptual grounds. The result
will  be a new integrative  framework which  I  call  enculturated predictive  pro-
cessing. Further, I  will  supplement Richard Menary’s enculturated approach to
mathematical cognition with an account of reading acquisition from this new per-
spective. In sum, I argue in this paper that the cognitive integrationist approach to
enculturated cognition needs to be combined with a predictive processing style
description in order to provide a full account of the neuronal, bodily, and environ-
mental components giving rise to cognitive practices. In addition, I submit that the
enculturated predictive processing approach arrives at a conceptually coherent
and empirically plausible description of reading acquisition.
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1 Introduction
In his target paper  Mathematical Cognition: A
Case of Enculturation, Richard Menary invest-
igates the conditions under which phylogenetic-
ally recent, socio-culturally shaped target phe-
nomena within cognitive science such as math-
ematics,  reading,  and  writing  have  emerged.
Resting on his  theory of  cognitive  integration
(CI;  e.g.,  Menary 2007a),  he  starts  from the
idea  that  these  processes  are  fully  continuous
with  phylogenetically  older  ones  (evolutionary
continuity). This type of continuity is justified
by the assumption that the evolution of neur-
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onal reuse mechanisms allows for the redeploy-
ment of cortical circuits for phylogenetically re-
cent  functions  (Anderson 2010;  Anderson &
Finlay 2014). Ontogenetically, neuronal reuse is
a  precondition  of  learning  driven  plasticity
(LDP), which “can result in both structural and
functional changes in the brain” (Menary this
collection, p. 8). That is, the human brain is as-
sumed to be neuronally plastic so that its pro-
cessing routines are altered as the individual ac-
quires  new  cognitive  abilities  (Ansari 2012).
However, the acquisition of new cognitive abilit-
ies takes place within 
[…]  a  highly  structured  cognitive  niche
that contains not only physical artefacts,
but also: representational systems that em-
body knowledge (writing systems, number
systems,  etc.);  skills  and  methods  for
training and teaching new skills (Menary
&  Kirchhoff 2014);  practices for manipu-
lating tools and representations. (Menary
this collection, p. 6)
It is this cognitive niche that provides the re-
sources for scaffolded learning, which allows the
individual  to  acquire  new  cognitive  abilities
through its ongoing embodied interaction with
its  socio-cultural  environment.  Together,  LDP
and scaffolded learning lead to cognitive trans-
formations  that  augment the individual’s  cog-
nitive capacities through ontogenesis:  “Cognit-
ive  transformations  result  from  our  evolved
plasticity and scaffolded learning in the develop-
mental  niche”  (Menary this  collection,  p.  8).1
The result of cognitive transformation is the ac-
quisition  of  a  sufficient  degree  of  expertise  in
performing a certain  cognitive practice. Cognit-
ive practices are normatively constrained to the
extent  that  socio-culturally shaped procedures
work  in  close  interaction  with  the  cognitive
niche: They “[…] are culturally endowed (bodily)
manipulations  of  informational  structures”
(Menary this collection, p. 4), such as manipu-
1 More precisely, according to  Menary (2014, p. 293) it is scaffolded
learning that renders LDP possible in the course of cognitive devel-
opment of individuals: “Both structural and functional plasticity can
result from both endogenous and exogenous sources, but here the fo-
cus  is  on  structural  and  functional  changes  driven  by  scaffolded
learning.”
lations of  tokens of  a  representational  writing
system, and they serve to complete a cognitive
task. In order to describe the transformational
processes  by which cognitive practices  are ac-
quired, Menary introduces the notion of  encul-
turation: “Enculturation rests on the acquisition
of  cultural  practices  that  are  cognitive  in
nature” (ibid.). That is, enculturation refers to
any  cognitive  transformation  that  is  rendered
possible by LDP and the individual’s  ongoing
interaction with its cognitive niche. As a proof
of concept,  Menary (this collection) deals with
mathematical cognition and describes the ways
in which individuals acquire expertise in manip-
ulating  a  public,  socio-culturally  developed
mathematical symbol system. Relying on a set
of empirical results, he arrives at the conclusion
that  precise  mathematical  operations  are
rendered possible by the recruitment of a neur-
onal sub-system during ontogeny. In contrast to
the evolved approximate number system (ANS),
which allows for subitizing and is also present in
other  animals,  the  neuronal  realization of  the
discrete number system (DNS) heavily depends
on LDP, the individual’s immersion into its cog-
nitive niche, and its active participation in scaf-
folded learning routines.  Thus,  the acquisition
of mathematical skills is an important example
of enculturation.
The purpose of this commentary is to en-
rich and refine the enculturated approach. First,
I  will  propose  that  the  predictive  processing
framework provides conceptual and explanatory
tools for describing and explaining the neuronal
and extracranial bodily mechanisms underlying
cognitive  practices  and  enculturation.  Thus,  I
will  accept  the challenge  to combine  “[…]  the
dynamical nature of causal commerce between
world, body, and brain and the inferential free
energy principle that allows their unification in
one account” (Hohwy this collection, p. 18). I
will  argue  that  a  new  integrative  framework
that views CI and predictive processing as com-
plementary  is  able  to  meet  this  challenge.
Second, I will illustrate this by presenting read-
ing acquisition as a paradigmatic case of encul-
turated cognition. In particular, I will demon-
strate that a position that combines the encul-
turated  approach  with  predictive  processing,
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which I call enculturated predictive processing,
leads to a parsimonious and conceptually coher-
ent account of reading acquisition that helps in-
terpret and unify a vast array of recent empir-
ical findings. 
2 Towards a more complete approach to 
enculturation: Cognitive integration and
predictive processing
In order to appreciate the descriptive power of
the enculturated approach, it is necessary to spe-
cify the mechanistic underpinnings of the acquisi-
tion of cognitive practices. In his summary of the
CI framework,  Menary (this collection, p. 2) ar-
gues that “[a]lthough the framework is unified by
a dynamical systems description of the evolution
of processing in the hybrid and multi-layered sys-
tem, it recognises the novel contributions of the
distinct processing profiles of the brain, body and
environment.”  However,  the  dynamical  systems
style approach to the acquisition and enactment
of cognitive practices in the version first  intro-
duced in Menary (2007a, pp. 42-48) does not ex-
haustively specify the distinct, yet highly interact-
ive neuronal and bodily components of cognitive
processing. Furthermore, it does not account for
LDP, simply because it  remains neutral to the
concrete  realization  of  its  neuronal  component
system. Finally, the dynamical systems approach,
on Menary’s construal, helps illustrate what the
interactive contribution of neuronal and extracra-
nial bodily components to human cognition might
amount to. Yet, it does not spell out the mutual
influence that neuronal  and extracranial  bodily
components have over each other. 
This  is  where predictive processing (PP)
enters the picture. In the remainder of this com-
mentary  I  will  argue  that  the  PP  approach
provides the resources for a more detailed ac-
count of how human cognitive systems become
enculturated and how they are subject to integ-
rated cognition. 
2.1 Cognitive integration: Five theses 
about human cognition
In its original version (cf. Menary 2007a), CI is
constituted by five theses. They emphasize the
different aspects that are crucial for an integra-
tionist approach to cognitive processing: 1. Hu-
man cognition is continuous with animal cogni-
tion on both diachronic and synchronic scales.
However,  it  has a special  status in  that  it  is
situated  in  a  particular  cognitive  niche  and
heavily rests upon neural plasticity which is it-
self an adaptation (continuity thesis). 2. Certain
cognitive processes are hybrid because they are
constituted by neuronal and extracranial bodily
components  (hybrid  mind  thesis).  3.  In  the
course  of  ontogenetic  hybrid  cognitive  pro-
cessing, both the constitutive neuronal and ex-
tracranial  bodily  functions  are  transformed
(transformation thesis). 4. The bodily manipu-
lation of specific environmental resources plays
a crucial functional role in integrated cognitive
processes  (manipulation  thesis).  5.  These  ma-
nipulations are constrained by cognitive norms,
which are acquired through learning, and which
realize socio-culturally developed habits for the
interaction  with  cognitive  resources  (cognitive
norms thesis). 
In  addition  to  the  continuity  thesis  and
the cognitive  transformation thesis,  which are
given centre stage in Menary’s target paper, the
hybrid mind thesis is important in that it ac-
knowledges the close interaction of neuronal and
extra-neuronal bodily sub-processes in the com-
pletion of cognitive tasks. In other words, cer-
tain cognitive processes “involve the integration
of neural manipulations of vehicles and bodily
manipulations of environmental vehicles” (Men-
ary 2010,  p.  236;  see  also  Menary 2007b,  p.
627). The notion of bodily manipulation as it is
used here goes back to  Mark Rowlands’ (1999,
pp.  23f)  account  of  environmentalism,  which
claims  that  “cognitive  processes  are,  in  part,
made up of manipulation of relevant structures
in the cognizer’s environment”. In this context,
manipulation is defined as “any form of bodily
interaction with the environment – manual or
not, intrusive or otherwise – which makes use of
the environment in order to accomplish a given
task”  (ibid.,  p.  23).  Thus,  subscribing  to  the
manipulation thesis amounts to the assumption
that “[c]ognitive processing often involves these
online  bodily  manipulations  of  the  cognitive
niche, sometimes as individuals and sometimes
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in collaboration with others” (Menary this col-
lection, p. 3).  Importantly, it is  assumed that
extracranial  bodily  manipulations  causally  in-
teract with neural sub-processes, thereby stress-
ing  the  hybridity  of  cognitive  processes  (cf.
Menary 2007a, p. 138). In addition to highlight-
ing  the  constitutive  role  of  embodied  engage-
ments  with  “external”  cognitive  resources  as
proposed by Rowlands (1999), cognitive integra-
tionists claim that the manipulation of these re-
sources  is  constrained  by  cognitive  norms.  In
this vein, Menary (2007a, p. 5; 2010, p. 233) ar-
gues that “[o]ur abilities to manipulate the ex-
trabodily  environment  are  normative  and  are
largely dependent on our learning and training
histories.” The idea that certain cognitive abilit-
ies are normatively structured thus concerns the
individual’s  interaction  with  specific  resources
provided  by  the  cognitive  niche.  Importantly,
the normatively constrained ways in which en-
vironmental  resources  are integrated into cog-
nitive processes are shared by many individuals.
Put  differently,  the  normativity  of  cognitive
practices helps “[…] stabilise and govern inter-
active  thought  across  a  population  of  similar
phenotypes” (Menary this collection, p. 4). Fur-
thermore, the acquisition of a certain cognitive
practice is  tightly connected with the acquisi-
tion  of  the  relevant  cognitive  norms  in  the
course  of  scaffolded  learning.  This  is  because
“we  learn  cognitive  practices  by  learning  the
cognitive norms that govern the manipulation of
vehicles” (Menary 2007b, p. 628). 
From these five theses defended by CI it
follows that there should be two distinct, yet in-
terdependent levels of description for cognitive
practices. First, there is the social level of de-
scription. On this level, cognitive practices need
to be approached by highlighting the interact-
ive,  cooperative  cognitive  achievements  of  a
large group of individuals sharing the same cog-
nitive niche. Second, cognitive practices can be
investigated by approaching them on an indi-
vidual level of description. In this case, the ac-
quisition and enactment of a certain cognitive
practice is described with regards to a certain
individual.  However,  any  individual  level  de-
scription needs to acknowledge that certain cog-
nitive capacities  of  an enculturated individual
are rendered possible  only by the individual’s
ongoing  interaction  with  its  socio-culturally
shaped environment in normatively constrained
ways. This means to do justice to the broader
socio-cultural context of enculturated cognition,
while being interested in a precise description of
its  neuronal  and extracranial  bodily  sub-com-
ponents. In this commentary I will operate on
the individual level of description without deny-
ing  that  it  is  important  to  develop  a  fine-
grained description on the social level by spe-
cifying  the  properties  of  a  certain  cognitive
niche and the conditions under which it could
have emerged.
To this end, I will now proceed by sum-
marizing  the  most  important  features  of  the
predictive  processing  (PP)  approach that  will
help  specify  the  mechanistic  underpinnings  of
enculturated cognition. 
2.2 An outline of predictive processing
Recently, the idea that human perception, ac-
tion,  and cognition  can be  described  and ex-
plained in terms of hierarchically organized pre-
dictive  processing mechanisms implemented in
the human brain has enjoyed widespread atten-
tion within cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Friston
2005,  2010;  Friston et al. 2012), philosophy of
mind, and philosophy of cognitive science (e.g.,
Clark 2012,  2013,  this collection;  Hohwy 2011,
2012,  2013,  2014,  this collection;  Seth this col-
lection). The overall epistemic goal of this emer-
ging approach is to describe perceptual, sensor-
imotor, and cognitive target phenomena within
a single framework by relying on unifying mech-
anistic principles. Accounts of PP generally as-
sume that human perception, action, and cogni-
tion are realized by Bayesian probabilistic gen-
erative  models  implemented  in  the  human
brain. Since the human brain does not have im-
mediate access to the environmental causes of
sensory effects, it has to infer the most probable
state of affairs in the environment giving rise to
sensory data (cf.  Seth this collection,  pp. 4f).
PP approaches solve this inverse problem by as-
suming  that  generative  models  in  accordance
with Bayes’ rule are implemented in the human
brain.  On  this  construal,  a  generative  model
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“[…] aims to capture the statistical structure of
some set of observed inputs by tracking […] the
causal  matrix  responsible  for  that  very struc-
ture” (Clark 2013, p. 182). In order to be able
to infer the causes of sensory effects, generative
models  encode  probability  distributions.  Each
generative  model  provides  several  hypotheses
about the causes of a certain sensory input. The
system  has  somehow  to  ‘decide’  which  hypo-
thesis needs to be chosen in order to account for
the cause of the sensory effect. The descriptive
power of Bayes’ rule lies in its capacity to cap-
ture  the  probabilistic  estimations  underlying
these choices. Applied to the case of human per-
ception, action, and cognition, Bayesian gener-
ative models are assumed to be realized in hier-
archically organized structures comprising mul-
tiple, highly interactive low- and high-level cor-
tical areas. This is referred to as the  Bayesian
brain hypothesis (cf.  Friston 2010, p. 129). The
hierarchical organization of probabilistic gener-
ative models is combined with a specific version
of  predictive  coding,  where  predictive  coding
“depicts  the  top-down  flow  as  attempting  to
predict  and  fully  ‘explain  away’  the  driving
sensory signal, leaving only any residual ‘predic-
tion errors’ to propagate forward within the sys-
tem” (Clark 2013, p. 182). That is to say, selec-
ted hypotheses  inform prior  predictions about
the sensory input to be expected at each level of
the hierarchy. These predictions fulfil the func-
tion  of  encoding  knowledge  about  statistical
regularities of patterns in the observable (or any
imaginable)  world.  This  hypothesis  selection
proceeds  in  accordance  with  Bayes’  rule.  The
processing of sensory input gives rise to predic-
tion errors.  Prediction  errors  carry  neuronally
realized information about “[…] residual differ-
ences,  at  every  level  and  stage  of  processing,
between the actual current signal and the pre-
dicted one” (Clark this collection, p. 4). Import-
antly, it is only prediction errors, and not sens-
ory input  per se, that are fed forward within
the hierarchy (cf.  Clark 2013, pp. 182f;  Hohwy
2012, p. 3, 2013, p. 47, 2014, p. 4). The overall
aim of this multi-level processing mechanism is
to minimize prediction error, that is, to reduce
or  to  ‘explain  away’  the  discrepancy  between
predictions and the actually given sensory input
that  is  an effect  of  environmental  (or bodily)
causes (cf.  Clark 2013, p. 187;  Hohwy 2011, p.
269,  2013, p. 88). This is known as  prediction
error minimization.2 
Prediction error minimization is a special
way  of  minimizing  free  energy in  accordance
with the principle “that any self-organizing sys-
tem that is at equilibrium with its environment
must minimize its free energy” (Friston 2010, p.
127). Applied to human perception, cognition,
and action, minimizing free energy means min-
imizing the amount of unbound energy available
to the perceiving, cognizing, and acting organ-
ism. This is  where prediction error enters the
picture. As  Andy Clark (2013, p. 186) puts it,
“[p]rediction error reports this information-the-
oretic free energy, which is mathematically con-
structed so as always to be greater than ‘sur-
prisal’  (where  this  names  the  sub-personally
computed implausibility of some sensory state
given a model of the world […]).” The relation-
ship between free energy and surprisal then is
that “[…] free energy is an upper bound on sur-
prise, which means that if agents minimize free
energy, they implicitly minimize surprise” (Fris-
ton 2010, p. 128). Suprisal, however, cannot be
estimated  directly  by  the  system,  because
“there is an infinite number of ways in which
the  organism could  seek  to  minimize  surprise
and  it  would  be  impossibly  expensive  to  try
them out” (Hohwy 2012, p. 3). The solution to
this problem lies in implicitly minimizing sur-
prisal (and its upper bound, i.e., free energy) by
minimizing prediction error (cf. Hohwy 2013, p.
85,  this collection, 3; see also  Seth this collec-
tion, p. 6). It is exactly here where prediction
2 On a neuronal level of description, hierarchical generative models
are  assumed to  be  neuronally  realized  by  multiple  connections
across  low- and high-level  cortical  areas.  Each level  within the
cortical  hierarchy  is  connected  to  the  next  subordinate  and
supraordinate level, thereby ensuring effective inter-level message
passing (cf.  Hohwy 2013, pp. 67f). According to  Clark (2013, p.
187), predictive generative models are implemented in “a kind of
duplex architecture”. This means that there are distinct neuronal
units  dedicated to the representation of  predictions  of  environ-
mental (or bodily) causes, so-called  representation units,  on the
one hand, and those dedicated to the encoding of prediction er-
ror, so-called error units, on the other (cf. ibid.; Friston 2005, p.
829). To date, a detailed account of the concrete neuronal realiz -
ation  of  these  functionally  distinct  units  of  message-passing  is
still missing (cf.  ibid.). However, it is hypothesized that repres-
entation  units  might  correspond  to  superficial  pyramidal  cells,
while  error units might correspond to deep pyramidal  cells  (cf.
Friston et al. 2012, p. 8; see also Clark 2013, pp. 187f).
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error minimization avails itself as a tractable ex-
pression of more general life-sustaining mechan-
isms.
Prediction  error  minimization  can  be
achieved  in  two  distinct,  yet  complementary
ways. The first of these is  perceptual inference,
which can be described as 
[…] an iterative step-wise procedure where
a hypothesis is chosen, and predictions are
made, and then the hypothesis is revised
in light of the prediction error, before new
and hopefully better predictions are made
on  the  basis  of  the  revised  hypothesis.
(Hohwy 2013, p. 45)
That is, prediction errors are propagated up the
hierarchy leading to an adjustment of the initial
hypothesis, thereby achieving an approximation
of the hypothesis generating the predictions and
the actually given input. The adjustment of pre-
dictions and hypotheses in the face of fed-for-
ward prediction error  occurs  at every level  of
the hierarchy until  any prediction error is  ac-
commodated. This complex process comprising
multiple levels is known as perception: “Percep-
tion thus involves ‘explaining away’ the driving
(incoming) sensory signal by matching it with a
cascade  of  predictions  pitched at  a  variety  of
spatial  and  temporal  scales”  (Clark 2013,  p.
187; see also Clark 2012, p. 762). 
On Andy Clark’s account of PP, one im-
portant consequence of  this  is  that  the tradi-
tional distinction between perception and cogni-
tion becomes blurred. It is replaced by a recon-
ceptualization of perceptual and cognitive pro-
cesses as a continuous employment of the same
prediction error minimizing mechanism on mul-
tiple scales: 
All  this makes the lines between percep-
tion  and  cognition  fuzzy,  perhaps  even
vanishing. In place of any real distinction
between perception and belief we now get
variable differences in the mixture of top-
down and bottom-up influence, and differ-
ences of temporal and spatial scale in the
internal  models  that  are  making  predic-
tions. Top-level (more ‘cognitive’) models
intuitively correspond to increasingly  ab-
stract conceptions of the world, and these
tend to capture or depend upon regularit-
ies at larger temporal and spatial  scales.
Lower-level (more ‘perceptual’) ones cap-
ture or depend upon the kinds of scale and
detail most strongly associated with spe-
cific  kinds  of  perceptual  contact.  (Clark
2013, p. 190)
Consequently,  processes  typically  associated
with perception or cognition can only be distin-
guished by considering the temporal and spatial
resolution of  the instantiation of  PP mechan-
isms and the levels at which model revision en-
sues,  respectively.  This  relationship  between
perception  and  cognition  becomes  important
once  we  consider  how  enculturated  cognition
has been rendered possible on both phylogenetic
and ontogenetic time scales. For it helps specify
how  evolutionary  continuity  could  have  been
rendered possible in the first place. The evolu-
tionary  development  of  perception  and  cogni-
tion (and, as we shall see, of action too) may
have proceeded from more perceptual generative
models present in many other animals to more
cognitive generative models exclusively realized
in  humans.  This  is  in  line  with  Roepstorff’s
(2013, p. 45) observation that “[t]he underlying
neural  models  are  basically  species-unspecific,
and the  empirical  cases  move  back  and forth
between many different model systems.” Refer-
ring to this observation,  Clark (this collection,
p. 14) emphasizes that “[t]he basic elements of
the  predictive  processing  story,  as  Roepstorff
(2013, p. 45) correctly notes, may be found in
many  types  of  organism  and  model-system.”
Thus,  while  certain  (lower-level)  model  para-
meters and processing stages of prediction error
minimization  are  shared  by  many  organisms,
there  certainly  are  specific  (higher-level)  pro-
cessing routines that are shared only by encul-
turated human organisms in a certain cognitive
niche.
Furthermore, the idea that perception and
cognition are continuous is relevant for consider-
ations of the ontogenetic development of encul-
turated cognitive functions. This is because it
anchors  higher-order  cognitive  operations  in
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more basic perceptual processes and thus allows
for a fine-grained description of a certain devel-
opmental trajectory leading to cognitive trans-
formation.  Bearing  in  mind  the  hierarchical
structure of generative models, another interest-
ing  consequence  of  the  PP style  approach to
perception  and  cognition  is  that  lower  (i.e.,
more perceptual) levels of the generative model
influence higher (i.e., more cognitive) levels by
means  of  fed-forward  prediction  error.  Vice
versa, higher levels of the hierarchical generative
model  influence lower levels  by means of  fed-
backward predictions (cf.  Hohwy 2013, p. 73).
This will become more important when we ex-
plore how reading acquisition can be described
as an ongoing enculturating process of predic-
tion error minimization.
Perceptual  inference  is  only  one  way  of
minimizing prediction error. The second is  act-
ive inference, where “[…] the agent will select-
ively sample the sensory input it expects” (Fris-
ton 2010, p. 129). The idea is that the system
can minimize prediction error by bringing about
the states of affairs (i.e., the environmental hid-
den causes) that are predicted by a certain hy-
pothesis.  This  is  achieved  by  performing  any
type of bodily movements, including eye move-
ments, that make the selected prediction come
true. The predictions at play in active inference
are counterfactual, because 
[…]  they  say  how  sensory  input  would
change if the system were to act in a cer-
tain way. Given that things are not actu-
ally that way, prediction error is induced,
which can be minimized by acting in the
prescribed way. (Hohwy 2013, p. 82; italics
in original; see also  Clark this collection,
p. 6; Friston et al. 2012, p. 2)
Accordingly, in active inference the selected pre-
diction  is  held  constant  and  leads  to  bodily
activities that minimize prediction error by al-
tering the sensory input such that it confirms
the prediction. Therefore, active inference is of
crucial importance for prediction error minimiz-
ation, “[…] since it provides the only way (once
a good world model is in place and aptly activ-
ated) to actually alter the sensory signal so as
to reduce sensory prediction error” (Clark 2013,
p. 202). 
This  suggests  that  perceptual  and active
inference,  or  perception  and bodily action for
that  matter,  mutually  influence  each  other,
thereby minimizing prediction errors and optim-
izing  hypotheses  generating  ever  new  predic-
tions. However, perceptual and active inference
have a “different direction of fit” (Hohwy 2013,
p.  178;  see also  Hohwy this  collection,  p.  13;
Clark this collection, p. 7).3 This is because in
perceptual inference, predictions are aligned to
the  sensory  input,  while  active  inference  is  a
matter of aligning the sensory input to the pre-
dictions. It follows “[…] that to optimally engage
in prediction error minimization, we need to en-
gage in perceptual inference and active inference
in a complementary manner” (Hohwy 2013, p.
91). Since both perceptual and active inference
are  aimed at  minimizing  prediction  error  and
optimizing generative models, “[p]erception and
action […] emerge as two sides of a single com-
putational coin” (Clark 2012, p. 760). 
As emphasized earlier, perception and cog-
nition are deeply related to the extent that both
phenomena are the result of the same underly-
ing functional and neuronal mechanisms. By ex-
tension, action is also deeply intertwined with
cognition.  This  follows  from  the  assumptions
that 1. perception and cognition are continuous
and 2. perception and action are subject to the
same  principles  of  prediction  error  minimiza-
tion. As Seth (this collection, p. 5) puts it, both
ways of prediction error minimization “[…] un-
fold continuously and simultaneously, underlin-
ing a deep continuity between perception and
action […].” Yet, perceptual and active inference
fulfil  distinct functional roles in their  ongoing
attempt to minimize prediction error. This be-
comes even more obvious once we take the free
energy principle into account: “The free energy
principle  […]  does  not  posit  any  fundamental
difference between perception and action. Both
fall out of different reorganizations of the prin-
ciple and come about mainly as different direc-
3 The notion of two functions having “a different direction of fit” originates
in  J. L. Austin’s (1953, p. 234) speech act theory and in  G. E. M.
Anscombe’s (1963, p. 56) example illustrating how words and states of
affairs can relate to each other. I would like to thank Thomas Metzinger
for pointing out the philosophical history of this notion.
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tions  of  fit  for  prediction  error  minimization
[…]” (Hohwy this collection, p. 13). Active infer-
ence  plays  a  crucial  role  in  cognition  (under-
stood as prediction error minimization compris-
ing many higher-level predictions), for it helps
minimize prediction  error  throughout the cor-
tical hierarchy by bringing about the states of
affairs in the environment that are predicted on
higher  levels.  Therefore,  on  Clark’s  (2013,  p.
187)  account,  which  he  dubs  action-oriented
predictive processing, prediction error minimiza-
tion “[…] depicts perception, cognition and ac-
tion as profoundly unified and, in important re-
spects, continuous.”
PP accounts of human perception, action,
and  cognition  distinguish  between  first-order
and second-order statistics. In contrast to first-
order  statistics,  which  amount  to  minimizing
prediction  error  by  means  of  perceptual  and
active  inference,  second-order  statistics  are
concerned with estimating the precision of pre-
diction error. In second-order statistics, the in-
fluence  of  fed-forward  prediction  error  on
higher  levels  of  the  hierarchical  generative
model is  dependent upon its estimated preci-
sion. Neuronally, the estimation of precision is
captured in terms of  increasing or decreasing
the  synaptic  gain of  specific  error  units  (cf.
Feldman & Friston 2010, p. 2). That is, “[t]he
more precision that is expected the more the
gain on the prediction error  in question, and
the more it gets to influence hypothesis revi-
sion”  (Hohwy 2013,  p.  66;  see  also  Friston
2010, p. 132). Conversely, if the precision is ex-
pected to be poor on the basis of second-order
statistics, the synaptic gain on the error unit is
inhibited  such  that  the  prediction  on  the
supraordinate level is strengthened (cf. ibid., p.
123).  It  has been proposed that precision es-
timation is equivalent to attention. This means
that “attention is nothing but optimization of
precision expectations in hierarchical predictive
coding” (Hohwy 2013, p. 70; see also  Feldman
& Friston 2010, p. 2). For current purposes, it
is sufficient to focus in the main on first-order
statistics. However, it is important to bear in
mind the crucial modulatory role precision es-
timation  plays  in  prediction  error  minimiza-
tion.
2.3 Combining cognitive integration and 
predictive processing
To what  extent  is  it  feasible  to  describe  the
mechanisms  underlying  cognitively  integrated
processes and enculturated cognition in terms of
prediction  error  minimization?  After  having
summarized CI and the core ideas of  the PP
framework I will argue in this section that there
are many aspects of the CI approach that can
be  enriched  by  making  a  crucial  assumption,
namely that PP can account for many compon-
ents constituting cognitive practices on at least
functional and neuronal levels of description.
First,  a major conceptual consequence of
PP is that perception, action, and cognition are
both  continuous  and unified,  if  this  approach
proves correct. This is because they follow the
same  principles  of  prediction  error  minimiza-
tion, yet are characterized by important func-
tional differences. This kind of complementarity
fits neatly with the hybrid mind thesis defended
by CI. Recall that the hybrid mind thesis claims
that cognitive processes are constituted by both
neuronal  and  extracranial  bodily  components.
By taking prediction error minimization into ac-
count, this claim can be cashed out by assuming
that the neuronal components are equal to per-
ceptual inferences at multiple levels of the cor-
tical hierarchy, while the bodily components are
mechanistically  realized  by  active  inferences.
The hybrid  mind thesis  emphasizes  the  indis-
pensable,  close  and  flexible  coordination  of
neuronal and bodily components responsible for
the  completion  of  a  cognitive  task.  The  PP
framework, or so I shall argue, provides the re-
sources for a careful description of the underly-
ing mechanisms at play. It does so by depicting
human organisms as being constantly engaged
in prediction error minimization by optimizing
hypotheses in the course of perceptual inference
and  by  changing  the  stimulus  array  in  the
course of active inference.
A second advantage of the prediction error
minimization  framework  is  that  it  helps  cash
out the manipulation thesis. This thesis, recall,
states  that  “the  manipulation  of  external
vehicles [is] a prerequisite for higher cognition
and  embodied  engagement  [is]  a  precondition
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for these manipulative abilities” (Menary 2010,
p. 232). In terms of the PP framework, bodily
manipulation can be understood as an instance
of active inference occurring in specific contexts.
That is, in order to complete a certain cognitive
task, the system changes its sensory input by al-
tering certain components of its cognitive niche.
This becomes even more obvious once we take
into  account that  embodied  activity  is  also  a
means of increasing confidence in sensory input
by optimizing its precision. As suggested by Ho-
hwy (this collection, p. 6), “expected precision
drives  action  such  that  sensory  sampling  is
guided by hypotheses that the system expects
will generate precise prediction error.” Applied
to an organism’s interaction with its socio-cul-
turally  shaped  environment,  Hohwy (2013,  p.
238) argues “[…] that many of the ways we in-
teract with the world in technical and cultural
aspects  can  be  characterized  by  attempts  to
make the link between the sensory input and
the  causes  more  precise  (or  less  uncertain).”
However, bodily manipulation is more than just
a contributing factor to prediction error minim-
ization (and precision optimization). In order to
acknowledge this, we need to take into account
that bodily manipulations are a crucial compon-
ent of the performance of cognitive practices. In
the  performance  of  a  cognitive  practice,  the
minimization of prediction error and the optim-
ization  of  precision  is  not  an  end  in  itself.
Rather, it serves to facilitate the completion of
a certain cognitive task. Furthermore, the con-
crete  bodily  manipulations  given  in  terms  of
active inference are subject to cognitive norms
that constrain the ways in which human organ-
isms  interact  with  cultural  resources,  such  as
tokens  of  a  representational  writing  system.
That is to say that the performance of a cognit-
ive practice is not an individualistic enterprise.
Rather, in completing a cognitive task, the indi-
vidual is deeply immersed into a socio-cultural
context which is shared by many human organ-
isms. 
Third, it is the normative constraints on
cognitive  practices  that  render  their  perform-
ance efficient and, in many cases at least, suc-
cessful. This is because compliance with these
norms induces what Andy Clark (2013, p. 195)
calls “path-based idiosyncrasies”. That is, one of
the reasons  why the  coordination of  neuronal
and bodily components in the manipulation of
cultural resources is beneficial certainly is that
it  takes  place  in  a  normatively  constrained
“multi-generational  development  of  stacked,
complex  ‘designer  environments’  for  thinking
such  as  mathematics,  reading,  writing,  struc-
tured discussion, and schooling” (ibid.). That is
to say that the performance of cognitive prac-
tices in compliance with certain norms has the
overall  advantage  of  reducing  cognitive  effort,
which can be captured as the minimization of
overall prediction error and the optimization of
precision on a sub-personal level of description.
At the same time, however, cognitive practices
themselves can be described, or so I shall argue,
as having prediction error minimization as their
underlying mechanism. This double role of cog-
nitive practices, described in terms of prediction
error  minimization,  can  be  fully  appreciated
once we consider the cognitive transformations
brought about by the ongoing interaction with
cultural resources.
Fourth,  our  cognitive  capacities  and  the
various  ways  we  complete  cognitive  tasks  are
profoundly  augmented  by  our  neuronal  and
bodily  engagements  with  the  socio-culturally
structured environment through ontogenesis (cf.
Menary 2006, p. 341). Put differently, “cognitive
transformations occur when the development of
the  cognitive  capacities  of  an  individual  are
sculpted by the cultural and social niche of that
individual” (Menary this collection, p. 8). This
niche  includes  mathematical  symbol  systems,
representational writing systems, artifacts, and
so forth. It is this immersion and, importantly,
the scaffolding provided by other inhabitants of
the  cognitive  niche  that  ideally  lead  to  the
transformation  of  neuronal  and  extracranial
bodily  components  constituting  cognitive  pro-
cesses, to enculturation that is. The PP frame-
work, or so I shall argue, offers a highly prom-
ising account of learning that is most suitable
for a sub-personal level description of cognitive
transformation. On the construal of PP, learn-
ing flows naturally from the mechanism of pre-
diction  error  minimization.  For  learning  can
generally be construed as a sub-personally real-
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ized  strategy of  optimizing  models  and hypo-
theses in the face of ever new prediction error:
“Learning is then viewed as the continual up-
dating  of  internal  model  parameters  on  the
basis of degree of predictive success: models are
updated until  they can predict  enough of  the
signal” (Hohwy 2011, p. 268).  Broadly under-
stood,  ‘learning’  thus  figures  as  an  umbrella
term referring to the ongoing activity of predic-
tion error minimization and model optimization
throughout the lifetime of a human organism.
This is because potentially ever new and “sur-
prisaling” sensory signals need to be “explained
away” by perceptual and active inference. For
current purposes, however, “learning” can also
be understood in a rather narrow sense as the
acquisition of a certain skill, which is also sub-
ject  to  prediction  error  minimization  through
perception, action, cognition, and the modula-
tion of attention. It is the individual’s socio-cul-
turally  structured  environment  that  delivers
new sensory signals helping optimize parameters
of the generative model:
But  those  training  signals  are  now  de-
livered as part of a complex developmental
web  that  gradually  comes  to  include  all
the complex regularities embodied in the
web of statistical relations among the sym-
bols and other forms of socio-cultural scaf-
folding in which we are immersed. We thus
self-construct  a  kind of  rolling  ‘cognitive
niche’  able  to  induce  the  acquisition  of
generative models whose reach and depth
far exceeds their apparent base in simple
forms of sensory contact with the world.
(Clark 2013, p. 195)
However, complex skills that are targeted at the
completion of cognitive tasks cannot be learned
simply by being exposed to the right kind of
“training signal” in the cognitive niche. What is
additionally needed is engagement in activities
that are scaffolded by inhabitants of that cog-
nitive niche who have already achieved a suffi-
cient degree of expertise. This is what  Menary
(this collection) calls “scaffolded learning”. From
the  perspective  of  PP,  this  amounts  to  the
strategy  of  exposing  predictive  systems  to
highly  structured,  systematically  ordered  pat-
terns  of  sensory  input  in  the  cognitive  niche.
This, however, needs to be complemented by a
fine-grained  personal-level  description  of  the
kind of interactions between experts and novices
that is needed in order to pass on the right set
of  cognitive  norms.  Furthermore,  the  kind  of
cognitive transformation at play here requires a
description  of  the  neuronal  changes  that  are
correlated with the acquisition of a certain cog-
nitive practice. That is, we need a more fine-
grained account of LDP and how it might be
realized  in  the  human  cortex.  From the  per-
spective  of  the  PP  framework,  one  plausible
conjecture at this point is that LDP can be cap-
tured in terms of effective connectivity. Effective
connectivity  reports  the  causal  interaction  of
neuronal assemblies across multiple levels of the
cortical  hierarchy  (and  across  different  brain
areas) as a result of attention in terms of preci-
sion estimation. This line of reasoning is implied
by  Clark (2013,  p.  190)  who  argues  that
“[a]ttention […] is simply one means by which
certain error-unit responses are given increased
weight, hence becoming more apt to drive learn-
ing and plasticity, and to engage in compensat-
ory action.” This last point is important, since
it stresses that it is not only perceptual infer-
ence that drives learning and contributes to the
improvement of generative models, but also act-
ive inference. However, this approach to the ac-
quisition of action patterns in concert with an
optimization of precision might raise the worry
that learning is depicted here as being a rather
internalistic,  brain-bound  affair.  But  once  we
acknowledge that it is the performance and on-
going  improvement  of  embodied  active  infer-
ences that play an indispensable functional role
in the completion of cognitive tasks, it becomes
obvious that this worry is not warranted. For it
is the efficient interaction of neuronal and ex-
tracranial  bodily  components  (i.e.,  perceptual
and active inferences in terms of PP) that res-
ults from learning and the efficient engagement
of  human  organisms  with  their  environment.
Furthermore,  LDP can  now  be  considered  in
terms of the precision-weighted optimization of
hypotheses  throughout  the  cortical  hierarchy
and  the  ever  new  patterns  of  effective  con-
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nectivity,  as  new  cognitive  practices  are  ac-
quired and successfully performed. The sub-per-
sonal description of cognitive transformation in
terms of prediction error minimization also does
justice to neuronal reuse as a guiding principle
of the allocation of neuronal resources for phylo-
genetically  recent  cognitive  functions  such  as
arithmetic or reading.
From  this,  the  following  question  arises:
What is the actual relationship between CI and
PP supposed to be and what is the scope of this
theory synthesis? First of all, the position de-
veloped in this commentary is neutral with re-
gards to metaphysical consequences that may or
may not result from the idea that CI and PP
can  be  integrated  into  a  unified  theoretical
framework. Rather, this position has an instru-
mentalist flavour to the extent that it tries to
answer the question by which means socio-cul-
turally shaped target  phenomena can be  best
investigated both conceptually and empirically.
Thus, the combination of  CI and PP is  valid
only  to  the  extent  that  it  displays  great  de-
scriptive as well as predictive power and is sup-
ported by many results stemming from empir-
ical research. As such, the new approach on of-
fer here is contingent upon the current state of
research in cognitive science. It is falsifiable by
new empirical evidence or convincing conceptual
considerations  that  directly  speak  against  it.
Furthermore, it sidesteps the concern that PP
and the underlying free energy principle might
be trivial because they can be applied to any
target phenomenon by telling a “just-so story”.
This is because the combination of CI and PP
is applied to specific domains, namely to classes
of  cognitive  processes  that  count  as  cognitive
practices, with reading being the paradigm ex-
ample.4 Thus  the  approach advocated  can be
seen  as  a  modest  contribution  to  the  project
aiming at a “[…] translation into more precise,
constricted  applications  to  various  domains,
where predictions can be quantified and just-so
stories avoided” (Hohwy this collection, p. 14).
The idea that CI and PP can be combined
can  lead  to  different  degrees  of  commitment.5
4 Thanks to Jennifer M. Windt for raising this point.
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions on this is-
sue.
First, I do not assume that CI necessarily requires
PP. Hypothetically, it is conceivable that another
theory of neuronal and bodily functioning might
be more suited to cashing out cognitive practices
and  enculturation  more  convincingly  and  more
extensively. To date, PP appears to be the best
unifying  framework that  helps  specify  exhaust-
ively the functional and neuronal contributions of
bodily and neuronal sub-processes giving rise to
cognitive practices and enculturation. This is be-
cause  PP  offers  a  fine-grained  functional  and
neuronal description of perception, action, cogni-
tion, attention, and learning that does justice to
the complex interactions stipulated by CI and the
associated approach to enculturation. 
Second, it could be assumed that CI and
PP are merely compatible. This would mean that
CI and PP were self-sufficient and co-existent the-
oretical  frameworks  whose  claims  and  key  as-
sumptions  do  not  necessarily  contradict  each
other. This compatibility assumption is too weak
for various reasons thar have been presented in
this commentary so far. For it is the purpose of
the theory synthesis sketched here to enrich and
refine the notion of enculturation and the associ-
ated theses defended by CI. Furthermore, to the
extent that PP directly speaks to complex cognit-
ive phenomena and learning, it benefits from the
effort of CI to do justice to the socio-culturally
shaped context in which these phenomena can be
developed. This is to say that CI and PP can be
directly referred to each other in ways that I have
started to illustrate in this section. 
Finally,  from  this  it  follows  that  both
frameworks  are  more  than  just  compatible  –
they are  complementary.  Taken together,  they
provide us with complex and far-reaching con-
ceptual tools for investigating complex cognitive
phenomena that are shaped by the individual’s
immersion in its cognitive niche. Thus, the com-
plementarity of CI and PP leads to a new integ-
rative framework that I dub enculturated pre-
dictive processing (EPP).
2.4 Defending enculturated predictive 
processing
At first glance, the EPP framework might ap-
pear  to  be  unwarranted.  For  prediction  error
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minimization  could  be  construed  as  being  a
purely internalistic, brain-bound affair that does
not leave any room for the idea that cognitive
processes are constituted both by neuronal and
extracranial bodily components that are norm-
atively  constrained,  socially  scaffolded,  and
deeply anchored in a socio-culturally structured
environment. 
First,  consider  a  position  that  takes  for
granted that cognitive processes can be coher-
ently described in terms of prediction error min-
imization, but which denies that cognitive pro-
cesses are co-constituted by neuronal and bodily
sub-processes  operating  on  socio-cultural  re-
sources. Such a position is defended by  Jakob
Hohwy (2013,  p.  240)  who  argues  that  “[…]
many cases of situated and extended cognition
begin to make sense as merely cases of the brain
attempting to optimize its sensory input so it,
as positioned over against the world, can better
minimize error.” In particular, according to his
interpretation of the prediction error minimiza-
tion framework, “[…] the mind remains secluded
from  the  hidden  causes  of  the  world,  even
though we are ingenious in using culture and
technology to allow us to bring these causes into
sharper focus and thus facilitate how we infer to
them.” (ibid., p. 239)
For Hohwy, this directly follows from the
causal relations holding between the predictive
system  and  the  environmental  causes  it  con-
stantly tries to infer. According to him (ibid., p.
228), this relation needs to be characterized as
“direct” and “indirect” at the same time: 
[…] the intuition that perception is indirect
is captured by its reliance on priors and
generative  models  to  infer  the  hidden
states of the world, and the intuition that
perception is direct is captured by the way
perceptual  inference  queries  and  is  sub-
sequently  guided  by  the  sensory  input
causally impinging on it.
Since the causal relation that holds between a
predictive system comprised of inverted generat-
ive models and the world is partly indirect, so
the argument goes,  the system is  in  constant
embodied interaction and direct contact with its
environment only insofar as it tries to make the
effects of hidden causes fit the predictions. This
precludes the theoretical possibility of depicting
prediction  error  minimizing  systems  as  being
situated, scaffolded, integrated, or extended. 
However, this line of reasoning fails to ac-
knowledge the conceptual necessity of emphasiz-
ing the functional role of embodied active infer-
ence in terms of its contribution to the minimiza-
tion of prediction error and the optimization of
predictions. For even if the causal relations hold-
ing between a predictive, generatively organized
system and environmental causes are mediated by
hypotheses, predictions, prediction errors and pre-
cision estimation as encoded in the cortical hier-
archy, it does not follow that this system is just a
passive receiver of sensory input that informs it
about remote states in the environment. Similarly,
it does not necessarily follow from the prediction
error minimization framework that it “[…] creates
a sensory blanket – the evidentiary boundary –
that is permeable only in the sense that inferences
can be made about the causes of sensory input
hidden beyond the boundary”, as  Hohwy (2014,
p. 7) claims. Rather, the predictive system is part
of its socio-culturally structured environment and
has many possibilities for bodily acting in that
environment in order to facilitate its own cognit-
ive  processing  routines.  Considering  embodied
active inference, it turns out that the causal rela-
tion holding between embodied action (in terms
of bodily manipulation) and changes of the set of
available stimuli in the environment is as direct as
any causal relation could be. This is because these
changes are an immediate effect of these very pre-
diction error-minimizing and precision-optimizing
actions, which in turn contribute to the perform-
ance of cognitive tasks. Furthermore, we need to
take into account that genuinely human cognitive
processes occur in a culturally sculpted cognitive
niche,  which  is  characterized  by  mathematical
symbol systems, representational writing systems,
artifacts, and the like, and other human organ-
isms with whom we interact. These cognitive re-
sources have unique properties that render them
particularly useful for the completion of cognitive
tasks.6 For example, consider the regularity of line
6 Thanks to Richard Menary for raising this important point in per-
sonal communication.
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arrangements  and the  orderliness  of  succeeding
letters  in  an  alphabetic  writing  system.  Once
learned and automatized, following these normat-
ive principles facilitates several types of cognitive
processing routines. That is to say that it is the
socio-culturally shaped sensory input itself  that
has an important impact on the concrete realiza-
tion of prediction error minimization. This cannot
be accounted for if we assume that the predictive
processing of  cognitive resources is  an internal-
istic, secluded endeavour.
Second, consider a line of reasoning that
goes against the compatibility of  CI with the
prediction  error  minimization  framework,  that
might be put forward by an integrationist. She
might agree that we need a mechanistic descrip-
tion  of  the  neuronal  and  bodily  components
which  jointly  constitute  cognitive  processes  in
the  close  interaction  with  socio-cultural  re-
sources. But she might continue to argue that
the performance of cognitive practices is more
than just the minimization of prediction error
and  the  optimization  of  precision.7 From  the
perspective of PP, it needs neither to be denied
that human cognitive systems as a whole aim to
fulfil cognitive purposes by completing cognitive
tasks and that they do so by engaging in cognit-
ive practices. Nor should it be rejected that cog-
nitive practices are normatively constrained and
that cognitive systems are deeply immersed in a
socio-culturally  structured  environment,  which
in turn provides these very norms through scaf-
folding teaching. However, the important theor-
etical contribution made by the prediction error
minimization  framework  is  its  providing  of  a
sub-personal, mechanistic description of the un-
derlying neuronal and bodily sub-processes that
turns out to be parsimonious, conceptually co-
herent,  and empirically  plausible.  In  addition,
PP also offers a description of the close interac-
tion  of  the  neuronal  and  bodily  components
constituting  cognitive  practices  by  offering  a
concise  description  of  the  ongoing,  mutually
constraining interplay of perceptual and active
inferences.  More  generally,  this  section  should
have established that all important claims and
assumptions made by CI in favour of cognitive
7 This consideration was put forward by Richard Menary in personal
communication.
practices, such as the hybridity, the transform-
ative  efficacy,  and  the  enculturated  nature  of
cognitive  processes,  can  be  supplemented  and
refined by taking the prediction error minimiza-
tion framework into account.
The  arguments  in  favour  of  the  EPP
framework directly speak to the current debate
within  philosophy  of  mind  and  philosophy  of
cognitive science about the relationship between
the  prediction  error  minimization  framework
and approaches to situated, distributed, integ-
rated, or extended cognition. On the one hand,
Jakob Hohwy (2013,  2014)  denies  on  both
methodological and metaphysical grounds that
there is anything like these types of cognition
from the perspective of prediction error minim-
ization. According to him, this is because pre-
dictive systems have only indirect access to the
world.  Furthermore,  there  is  “the  sensory
boundary  between  the  brain  and  the  world”
which prohibits  predictive systems from enga-
ging in any variant of situated, distributed, in-
tegrated,  or  extended  cognition  including  CI
(Hohwy 2013, p. 240). On the other hand, Andy
Clark (2013, p. 195) argues that the PP frame-
work at least “[…] offers a standing invitation to
evolutionary,  situated,  embodied,  and  distrib-
uted approaches to help ‘fill in the explanatory
gaps’  while  delivering a schematic  but  funda-
mental  account  of  the  complex  and  comple-
mentary roles of  perception,  action,  attention,
and environmental  structuring.”  Once we take
the arguments and considerations in favour of
EPP into account we have reasons to think that
EPP lends support to Clark’s construal of the
PP framework. This will become even more per-
suasive  once  we  take  empirical  data  and  a
paradigm case of EPP into account.
3 Reading acquisition: A case of 
enculturation
So far, I have argued that the notion of encul-
turation and key claims made by CI can be en-
riched  by  taking  the  PP  framework  into  ac-
count.  In  particular,  the  hybridity,  embodied-
ness, and transformative character of encultur-
ated cognition can be mechanistically described
in terms of prediction error minimization. How-
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ever, cognitive practices cannot be fully reduced
to  prediction  error  minimization,  since  they
have a normative dimension that needs to be in-
vestigated on a personal level of description.
This section serves to illustrate the valid-
ity of the line of reasoning put forward in this
commentary. This will be done by showing that
reading acquisition, understood as another case
of  enculturation  next  to  mathematical  cogni-
tion, can be fruitfully described from the per-
spective of EPP.
3.1 Scaffolded learning and the 
acquisition of cognitive norms
One crucial aspect of learning to perform a cog-
nitive practice is the acquisition of the relevant
cognitive norms, where this class of norms “gov-
ern[s] manipulations of external representations,
which aim at completing cognitive tasks” (Men-
ary 2010, p. 238). In the case of reading, these
norms concern the recognition and identification
of tokens of a representational writing system.
In alphabetic  writing  systems,  important  cog-
nitive norms are derived from the so-called  al-
phabetic principle, where this principle amounts
to the “mapping [of] written units onto a small
set of elements – the phonemes of a language”
(Rayner et  al. 2001,  p.  33;  see  also  Snowling
2000, p. 87). Specifically, the correspondence of
graphemes to phonemes puts culturally estab-
lished,  normative  constraints  on  the  ways  in
which  individual  letters  (and  combinations
thereof) are related to phonological units. The
normative  scope  of  these  correspondences  is
best illustrated by differences across languages
and orthographies. As pointed out by Ziegler &
Goswami (2006, p. 430), “[i]n some orthograph-
ies, one letter or letter cluster can have multiple
pronunciations (e.g.  English,  Danish),  whereas
in others it is always pronounced in the same
way  (e.g.  Greek,  Italian,  Spanish).”8 This
demonstrates that the degree of consistency or
transparency of  grapheme-phoneme correspond-
ences is subject to arbitrary stipulations by a
linguistic, literate community employing a spe-
cific orthographic system. These stipulations are
8 This phenomenon is also known as orthographic depth. For a recent
review, see Richlan (2014).
normative insofar as they constrain the ways in
which  combinations  of  letters  are  pronounced
and  written  words  are  correctly  related  to
spoken words. The acquisition of this normative
knowledge needs “explicit instruction in the al-
phabetic principle” (Rayner et al. 2001, p. 57).9
It follows that learning these norms is socially
structured and dependent upon the cooperation
of  experts  with novices.  This  fits  neatly  with
Menary’s (2013, p. 361) following assumption: 
Manipulative  norms  and  interpretative
norms  apply  to  inscriptions  of  a  public
representational  system  and  are  never
simply  dependent  on  an  individual.  In-
deed, it is the individual who must come
to  be  transformed  by  being  part  of  the
community  of  representational  system
users.
Acquiring knowledge about grapheme-phoneme
correspondences,  especially  in  an  inconsistent
orthography such as English, puts demands not
only on the novice, but also on the teachers who
assist her in learning these correspondences. For
the teachers, being experts in reading, need to
break down their automatic identification and
recognition skills in order to be able to teach
the norms underlying the relationship between
graphemes and phonemes. As Sterelny (2012, p.
145)  points  out  more generally,  “[e]xpert  per-
formance is often rapid and fluent, without ob-
vious components. Learning from such perform-
ance is difficult. It becomes much easier if the
task is overtly decomposed into segments, each
of which can be represented and practiced indi-
vidually.” In the present context, the most suc-
cessful strategy of teaching grapheme-phoneme
correspondence has turned out to be so-called
phonics instruction (cf.  Rayner et al. 2001, pp.
31f): “[…] teaching methods that make the al-
phabetic principle explicit result in greater suc-
cess among children trying to master the read-
ing skills than methods that do not make it ex-
plicit” (ibid., p. 34). This goes along with teach-
ing  novices  that  spoken  language  consists  of
phonemes.  That  is,  children’s  reading  acquisi-
9 See also  Dehaene (2010, p. 219),  Dehaene (2011, p. 26), and  Frith
(1985, p. 307).
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tion is dependent upon, or at least co-develops
with  phonological awareness,  where this is un-
derstood as “[…] the ability to perceive and ma-
nipulate the sounds of spoken words” (Castles
&  Coltheart 2004,  p.  78).  The  metalinguistic
awareness that  spoken  language  consists  of
phonemes must be explicitly acquired and al-
lows the novice to learn that these units corres-
pond to letters,  or combinations thereof.  It is
still debated whether phonological awareness is
a prerequisite for learning to read or whether it
is co-emergent with basic letter decoding skills.
However, as suggested by  Castles &  Coltheart
(2004, p. 104), “[…] it may not be possible for
phonemic awareness to be acquired at all in the
absence  of  instruction  on  the  links  between
phonemes and graphemes.” Thus, it seems safe
to assume that  phonological  awareness  clearly
facilitates  the  ability  to  relate  graphemes  to
phonemes. There are other components of meta-
linguistic awareness that influence the successful
application of norms governing alphabetic rep-
resentational writing systems. Beginning readers
are already proficient  speakers  of  their  native
language  and  are  able  to  fluently  apply  syn-
tactic, semantic, and pragmatic norms in their
everyday conversations. However, they are usu-
ally  unable  to  explicitly  represent  that  utter-
ances are made up of sentences and that sen-
tences are made up of  combinations of  words
(cf.  Frith 1985, p. 308;  Rayner et al. 2001, p.
35). To novices, these basic properties must be
made explicitly available in order to put those
novices  in  the  position  to  apply  knowledge
about them automatically and fluently at later
stages  of  reading  acquisition.  Furthermore,
novices need to be acquainted with the conven-
tion, which is fairly obvious to expert readers,
that  alphabetic  writing  systems  are  decoded
from left to right and from the top to the bot-
tom of a page. These basic personal-level com-
ponents  of  the  acquisition  of  reading  skills
provide  the  cognitive norms necessary for  the
development of reading understood as a cognit-
ive practice. It is these norms that govern the
successful  manipulation  of  representational
vehicles belonging to an alphabetic writing sys-
tem that need to be established by social inter-
action between learners and teachers. Thus, be-
coming  proficient  in  applying  the  alphabetic
principle, getting to grips with phoneme-graph-
eme correspondences,  and developing phonolo-
gical and metalinguistic awareness are cases of
scaffolded learning.
3.2 Reading acquisition and neuronal 
transformation
Next to scaffolded learning, another crucial as-
pect  of  cognitive  transformation  is  LDP  (cf.
Menary 2013, p. 356,  this collection, p. 8). In-
deed, in the case of reading acquisition, there is
unequivocal  evidence  pointing  to  “[…]  plastic
changes in brain function that result from the
acquisition of  skills”  (Ansari 2012,  p. 93).  By
the  same token,  Ben-Shachar et  al. (2011,  p.
2397)  emphasize  that  “[…]  culturally  guided
education  couples  with  experience-dependent
plasticity to shape both cortical processing and
reading development.” As Schlaggar & McCand-
liss (2007, p. 477) point out, the application of
knowledge  about  grapheme-phoneme  corres-
pondences in novice readers “[…] implicates the
formation  of  functional  connections  between
visual object processing systems and systems in-
volved in processing spoken language.” The left
ventral occipitotemporal (vOT) area appears to
play a crucial role in establishing these connec-
tions. 
As mentioned by Menary (this collection),
there has been consensus on the contribution of
the vOT area to a neuronal reading circuit. In a
series  of  experiments,  Stanislas  Dehaene,
Laurent Cohen and their colleagues have made
the remarkable discovery that neuronal activa-
tion  in  one  particular  region  of  the left  vOT
area is reliably and significantly associated with
visual  word recognition in adult,  non-patholo-
gical readers (Cohen & Dehaene 2004; Dehaene
2005, 2010; Dehaene & Cohen 2011; Dehaene et
al. 2005; McCandliss et al. 2003; Vinckier et al.
2007). This region, especially the left ventral oc-
cipito-temporal  sulcus  next  to  the  fusiform
gyrus, frequently responds to visually presented
words regardless of the size, case, and font in
which  they  are  made  available  (cf.  Dehaene
2005, p. 143;  McCandliss et al. 2003, p. 293).
This consistent finding has led these researchers
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to call it the visual word form area (VWFA),
since it  crucially contributes to “[…] a critical
process  that  groups  the letters  of  a  word to-
gether into an integrated perceptual unit (i.e. a
‘visual word form’)” (McCandliss et al. 2003, p.
293). However, it is debatable whether the left
vOT  area  is  almost  exclusively  dedicated  to
visual  word  recognition  in  expert  readers,  or
whether this area serves several functions hav-
ing  to  do  with  the  (visual)  identification  of
shapes  more  broadly  construed  (see  Price &
Devlin 2003,  2004, for a discussion). Neverthe-
less, the findings by Dehaene and his colleagues
that the left vOT area plays a crucial role in
the  overall  visual  word  recognition  process  is
important  and  widely  acknowledged,  although
the interpretations of its functional contribution
differ. 
An important motivation for research on
the overall function of the left vOT area stems
from considerations on the phylogenetic devel-
opment of visual word recognition. Consider-
ing  that  writing  systems  were  invented  only
approximately  5400  years  ago,  it  is  unlikely
that  the  ability  to  read  is  the  result  of  an
evolutionary  process  (cf.  Dehaene 2005,  p.
134,  2010,  p.  5;  McCandliss et  al. 2003,  p.
293). In a nutshell, the crucial question is how
visual word recognition is possible given “[…]
that the human brain cannot have evolved a
dedicated mechanism for reading” (Dehaene &
Cohen 2011, p. 254). This is also referred to
as  the  “reading  paradox”  (Dehaene 2010,  p.
4). The solution to this paradox proposed by
Dehaene and his colleagues is to assume “[…]
that  plastic  neuronal  changes  occur  in  the
context of strong constraints imposed by the
prior  evolution  of  the  cortex”  as  a  result  of
the human organism being exposed to tokens
of a certain writing system (Dehaene & Cohen
2011, p. 254). Specifically, the idea is “[…] that
writing evolved as a recycling of  the ventral
visual cortex’s competence for extracting con-
figurations  of  object  contours”  (ibid.).  This
view, which has been dubbed the neuronal re-
cycling hypothesis (cf.  Dehaene 2005, p. 150),
suggests that existing neuronal functions asso-
ciated with visual cognition are “recycled” for
the  phylogenetically  recent,  ontogenetically
acquired capacity to recognize visually presen-
ted words (cf. Cohen & Dehaene 2004, p. 468;
see  also  Menary 2014,  p.  286).  This  “recyc-
ling”  is  in  turn  constrained  by  the  overall
evolved neuronal architecture and already ex-
isting  processing  mechanisms  (cf.  Dehaene
2010,  pp.  146f).  Thus,  neuronal  recycling  is
just a special type of neuronal reuse (see An-
derson 2010, for a discussion). There are cer-
tain conditions that need to be met if a spe-
cific  cortical  area  is  to  be  ‘recycled’  for  a
phylogenetically recent cognitive function (see
Menary 2014,  p.  288).  In  the  case  of  visual
word  recognition,  the  left  vOT  area  is  as-
sumed  to  exert  certain  “functional  biases”
that make it most suitable for the recognition
and identification of visually presented words:
“(1)  a  preference  for  high-resolution  foveal
shapes;  (2)  sensitivity  to  line  configurations;
and  (3)  a  tight  proximity,  and,  presumably,
strong  reciprocal  interconnection  to  spoken
language  representations  in  the  lateral  tem-
poral  lobe”  (Dehaene &  Cohen 2011,  256).
These  “functional  biases”,  however,  do  not
preclude  that  the  left  vOT area  is  still  en-
gaged in other cognitive processes such as ob-
ject  recognition  in  skilled  adult  readers  (cf.
Carreiras et al. 2014, p. 93; Dehaene & Cohen
2011,  p.  257;  Price &  Devlin 2004,  p.  478).
Rather, it helps explain why this area is found
to  be  well-equipped  for  contributing  to  the
overall  process  of  visual  word  recognition.
However, the question arises what the contri-
bution  of  the  left  vOT  area  to  the  overall
visual word recognition process is supposed to
make.  According  to  Cathy Price’s  &  Joseph
Devlin’s (2011) Interactive Account (IA), the
contribution of the left vOT area can be best
described  and  explained  in  terms  of  PP.  In
line  with  the  general  principles  of  the  PP
framework  presented  above,  they  generally
hold  the  following  assumption:  “Within  the
hierarchy, the function of a region depends on
its synthesis of bottom-up sensory inputs con-
veyed  by  forward  connections  and  top-down
predictions  mediated  by  backward  connec-
tions” (Price & Devlin 2011, p. 247). In other
words, the suggested synthesis equals the pre-
diction error that results from the discrepancy
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between top-down predictions and bottom-up
sensory information.  Applied to the patterns
of  neuronal  activation associated  with  visual
word recognition, this assumption is specified
as follows: 
For reading, the sensory inputs are written
words (or Braille in the tactile modality)
and the predictions are based on prior as-
sociation of  visual  or  tactile  inputs with
phonology  and  semantics.  In  cognitive
terms,  vOT  is  therefore  an  interface
between  bottom-up  sensory  inputs  and
top-down  predictions  that  call  on  non-
visual stimulus attributes. (Price & Devlin
2011, p. 247)
Accordingly, the vOT area is supposed to be as-
sociated with a distinct level of the hierarchical
generative model responsible for visual word re-
cognition  mediating  between  higher-level,  lan-
guage-related predictions and bottom-up visual
information. It follows that “[…] the neural im-
plementation  of  classical  cognitive  functions
(e.g.  orthography,  semantics,  phonology)  is  in
distributed patterns of activity across hierarch-
ical levels that are not fully dissociable from one
another”  (ibid.,  p.  249).  Specifically,  IA  pro-
poses  a  neuronal  mechanism  that  is  able  to
demonstrate  how  linguistic  knowledge  about
phonology and semantics, encoded in top-down
predictions,  causally  interacts  with  bottom-up
information.  This  is  because it  is  held that a
prediction error is generated each time bottom-
up  information  diverges  from  the  associated
top-down prediction. In turn, the resulting pre-
diction error is associated with significant activ-
ation in the left vOT area. Empirical evidence
supporting this approach to the functional con-
tribution of the left vOT area to visual word re-
cognition in expert readers is  widely available
(see, e.g.,  Bedo et al. 2014;  Kherif et al. 2011;
Kronbichler et  al. 2004;  Schurz et  al. 2014;
Twomey et al. 2011). 
In reading acquisition, the left vOT area
appears to be an equally important contributor
to visual word recognition. According to  Price
& Devlin (2011, p. 248), the activation level of
the vOT area develops in a non-linear fashion,
as the proficiency in visual word recognition in-
creases:
In pre-literates, vOT activation is low be-
cause  orthographic  inputs  do  not  trigger
appropriate  representations  in  phonolo-
gical or semantic areas and therefore there
are  no  top-down influences  […].  In  early
stages of learning to read, vOT activation
is  high  because-top-down  predictions  are
engaged imprecisely and it takes longer for
the  system to  suppress  prediction  errors
and identify the word […]. In skilled read-
ers, vOT activation declines because learn-
ing  improves  the  predictions,  which  ex-
plain prediction error efficiently […].
That is, IA assumes that the level of activation
within the left vOT area is dependent upon the
general establishment and refinement of a gen-
erative model comprising both lower-level areas
associated  with  visual  processing  and  higher-
level cortical areas associated with phonological
and semantic knowledge. If this account turns
out to be correct, the blurredness of the distinc-
tion between perception and cognition as sug-
gested by Clark (2013) becomes vitally import-
ant. For it is the mutual interplay of lower-level
processing stages (traditionally associated with
visual  processing)  and  higher-level  processing
stages  (traditionally  associated  with  phonolo-
gical and semantic processing) that renders the
successful acquisition of visual word recognition
possible in the first place. Evidence in favour of
IA comes from studies demonstrating that there
is a significant increase of activation in this area
as  a  result  of  exposure  to  visually  presented
words in beginning readers across different re-
search paradigms and methodologies employing
fMRI (e.g., Ben-Shachar et al. 2011; Gaillard et
al. 2003; Olulade et al. 2013). Furthermore, two
longitudinal  ERP  studies  (Brem et  al. 2010;
Maurer et al. 2006) demonstrate that the left-
lateralized occipito-temporal N1 effect, an effect
associated with print  sensitivity,  does not  de-
velop in a linear fashion in the course of reading
acquisition.  Rather,  Maurer et  al.’s  (2006,  p.
756) comparison of their results obtained from
their  child  participants  with  an  adult  control
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group indicates  that  “[i]nstead of  a  linear  in-
crease with more proficient reading, the devel-
opment is strongly nonlinear: the N1 specializa-
tion peaks after learning to read in beginning
readers and then decreases with further reading
practice  in  adults  following  an  inverted  U-
shaped developmental time-course.” In this vein,
Brem et al. (2010, p. 7942) interpret their res-
ults by suggesting that “[t]he emergence of print
sensitivity in cortical areas during the acquisi-
tion of grapheme-phoneme correspondences is in
line  with  the  inverse  U-shaped  developmental
trajectory of print sensitivity of the ERP N1,
which peaks in beginning readers […].” 
Another consequence of Price’s & Devlin’s
(2011) PP account of reading acquisition is that
the activation level within the vOT should be
associated with the degree of accuracy of top-
down predictions in the face of bottom-up sig-
nals.  This  is  supported  by  various  studies
demonstrating  that  higher-level  activations  of
cortical  areas  associated  with  language  pro-
cessing  are  also  present  in  beginning  readers.
For example,  Turkelhaub et al. (2003, p. 772)
report that “[a]ctivity in the left ventral inferior
frontal gyrus increased with reading ability and
was related to both phonological awareness and
phonological naming ability. […] Brain activity
in the anterior middle temporal gyrus also in-
creased with reading ability”, where this area is
associated with semantic processing.  Similarly,
Gaillard et al. (2003) report activation in the
middle temporal gyrus, which is frequently asso-
ciated with semantic processing in expert read-
ers  (e.g.,  Bedo et  al. 2014,  p.  2;  Price &
Mechelli 2005, p. 236; Vogel et al. 2013, p. 231;
Vogel et al. 2014, p. 4). Furthermore, they re-
port significant activation patterns in left IFG,
which is associated with both phonological and
semantic processing. 
In the light of much empirical evidence in
favour of Price’s & Devlin’s (2011) approach to
the neuronal changes corresponding to reading
acquisition, it seems safe to assume that it is
empirically plausible and can account for many
data  derived  from  experiments  in  cognitive
neuroscience. However, to what extent can this
approach be conceptually enriched? Recall that
learning a new skill  such as reading is just a
special case of overall prediction error minimiza-
tion according to the PP framework.  On this
construal, learning to read means becoming in-
creasingly efficient in predicting linguistic, visu-
ally presented input as a result of long-term ex-
posure to types of this input and the optimiza-
tion of hypotheses through perceptual inference.
The careful instruction in relating graphemes to
phonemes,  phonological  and  metalinguistic
awareness, and the normatively constrained al-
phabetic  principle  provides  the  environmental
conditions for efficient  and progressively more
accurate prediction error minimization. The sig-
nals delivered by this highly structured learning
environment  are  estimated  as  being  precise,
such that the synaptic gain on error units re-
porting the discrepancy between (still inaccur-
ate) predictions and prediction error is high. As
learning  to read proceeds,  the predictions  be-
come more accurate and the overall influence of
prediction error shows a relative decrease. This
line  of  reasoning  is  supported  by  Price’s  &
Devlin’s (2011, p. 248) following suggestion: “At
the neural level, learning involves experience-de-
pendent synaptic plasticity, which changes con-
nection strengths and the efficiency of percep-
tual inference.” Understood this way, LDP and
the associated neuronal transformations can be
understood as being realized by prediction error
minimization in the context of scaffolded learn-
ing, which allows a beginning reader to become
ever more efficient and successful in this partic-
ular cognitive practice. 
3.3 Reading acquisition and bodily 
transformation
Starting from the hybrid mind thesis defended
by CI, which states that certain cognitive pro-
cesses are constituted by both neuronal and ex-
tracranial bodily sub-processes, it seems natural
to assume that reading acquisition also is asso-
ciated  with the  transformation of  bodily sub-
processes. That is, in the course of encultura-
tion it is the enactment of bodily manipulation
that is transformed in addition to the neuronal
changes occurring as a result of LDP. In terms
of PP, this assumption leads to the suggestion
that it is not only perceptual inferences that are
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causally relevant for learning described in terms
of prediction error minimization, but also active
inferences that allow for ever more efficient sub-
personally  employed  strategies  for  “explaining
away” incoming sensory input. Recall that eye
movements are just a special case of active in-
ference  (see  e.g.,  Friston et  al. 2012).  Their
functional contribution to prediction error min-
imization becomes vitally important for a com-
plete account of visual word recognition and its
acquisition. This is because visual word recogni-
tion, in both novices and experts, is  rendered
possible by the coordination of perceptual and
active inference. From the perspective of CI, the
idea  here  is  that  the  ways  in  which  an  indi-
vidual  bodily  manipulates  a  certain  cognitive
resource is importantly improved in the course
of cognitive transformation. Applied to reading
acquisition,  this  leads  to the assumption that
specific eye movement patterns become more ef-
ficient as a result of reading instruction and it-
erate exposure to a certain type of cognitive re-
source (say, sentences printed on a piece of pa-
per).
Recently, it has become possible to invest-
igate  eye  movements  in  beginning  readers  by
employing eye-tracking methodologies.  Conver-
ging  evidence  suggests  that  beginning  readers
make more fixations (i.e.,  acquisition of visual
information in the absence of oculomotor activ-
ities), saccades (i.e., oculomotor activities), and
regressions  (i.e.,  backward  saccades),  and  ex-
hibit longer fixation durations and smaller sac-
cade  amplitudes  than  proficient  and  expert
readers (cf.  Joseph et al. 2013, p. 3;  Rayner et
al. 2001, p. 46). More specifically, these tenden-
cies are assessed in a longitudinal eye-tracking
study reported by Huestegge et al. (2009). They
measured eye movements during an oral reading
task in second and fourth graders of a German
primary school and additionally assessed overall
reading skills and oculomotor behaviour beyond
reading  (cf.  Huestegge et  al. 2009,  p.  2949).
Their results indicate that the fourth graders, in
comparison to the second graders, show a de-
crease of fixation duration, gaze duration, total
reading  time,  refixations,  and  saccadic  amp-
litudes  (cf.  ibid.,  p.  2956).  Huestegge et  al.
(2009,  p.  2958)  attest  that  the  younger,  less
proficient  readers  show  a  “[…]  refixation
strategy, with initial saccade landing positions
located closer to word beginnings.” Similarly to
Huestegge et al. (2009), Seassau et al. (2013) re-
port  a  longitudinal  study  comparing  the  per-
formance of 6- to 11-year-old children in a read-
ing task and a visual task. In line with the em-
pirical evidence already mentioned, their results
indicate that “[w]ith age, children’s reading cap-
abilities  improve  and  they  learn  to  read  by
making  larger  progressive  saccades,  fewer  re-
gressive  saccades  and  shorter  fixations  […]”
(Seassau et al. 2013, p. 6).  Furthermore, it is
demonstrated that the eye movement patterns
employed  in  reading  and  in  visual  search  di-
verge  with  increasing  reading  proficiency  (cf.
ibid., p. 9). 
An explanation of these results in terms of
PP is straightforward. In beginning readers, the
predictions initiating active inference occurring
in a highly-structured linguistic environment are
inaccurate, such that the generation and execu-
tion of eye movements in terms of active infer-
ence is not as efficient as it is in the case of ex-
pert readers. By the same token, the inaccuracy
of the currently selected prediction makes it ne-
cessary  to  sample  the  visually  available  lin-
guistic environment more thoroughly, explaining
the “refixation strategy” and the execution of
comparatively more saccades. As reading skills
improve,  resulting  from  increasingly  efficient
prediction  error  minimization  through percep-
tual inference as already suggested, the accur-
acy of predictions becomes increasingly optimal,
therefore allowing for more efficient active infer-
ence. More efficient active inference, in turn, al-
lows  for  more  efficient  perceptual  inference,
since both types of inference mutually influence
each other. This line of reasoning is supported
by  Huestegge et al.’s (2009, p. 2957) claim in-
formed by the results of their study “[…] that
only linguistic,  not oculomotor skills  were the
driving force behind the acquisition of normal
oral reading skills.” Thus, the increase in effi-
ciency of  eye movements in beginning readers
does not result from an increase in oculomotor
capabilities  per se,  but works in tandem with
higher-level linguistic knowledge encoded in pre-
dictions, which are associated with representa-
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tions in higher-order cortical areas. As a result,
the  improvement  of  active  inference  in  the
course of reading acquisition works in tandem
with the improvement of  perceptual inference.
This highlights that learning to read does not
only result in neuronal, but also in bodily trans-
formations.  As  such,  the  optimization  of  eye
movements in the course of reading acquisition
highlights  the importance of  bodily manipula-
tion in the efficient enactment of reading under-
stood as a cognitive practice. This also means
to suggest that a complete account of encultura-
tion should not only pay attention to scaffolded
learning  and  LDP,  but  also  to  the  develop-
mental trajectory of bodily manipulation.
4 Concluding remarks
This  commentary on  Richard  Menary’s  paper
Mathematical Cognition: A Case of Encultura-
tion started from the assumption that the gen-
eral outline of enculturation and the associated
claims made by CI provide important concep-
tual tools for the description of ontogenetically
acquired, socio-culturally shaped cognitive pro-
cessing routines.  However,  I  have argued that
the idea of enculturation and its most import-
ant  aspects,  namely  cognitive  transformation
and scaffolded learning, need to be enriched by
providing a detailed functional and neuronal de-
scription on a sub-personal level of description.
In addition, it needs to be born in mind that
enculturation is rendered possible by normative
constraints developed by a large group of indi-
viduals  sharing  the  same  cognitive  niche.  To
this end, I have suggested that the notion of en-
culturation  and  its  associated  constitutive  as-
pects can be complemented in important ways
by taking the PP framework into account. The
result is what I call enculturated predictive pro-
cessing. Thus, the PP framework is capable of
providing the conceptual resources necessary for
a thorough description of  the mechanistic  un-
derpinnings of cognitive practices and their ac-
quisition. Lending further support to this line of
reasoning, I have dealt with reading acquisition
as a paradigmatic case of enculturated predict-
ive processing. This should have been sufficient
to establish that the CI framework is well-suited
for  a  conceptually  coherent  description of  the
interaction  between brain,  body,  and environ-
mental cognitive resources. However, it needs to
be  supplemented  by  a  sub-personal  level  de-
scription in terms of prediction error minimiza-
tion in order to be able to specify the neuronal
and  functional  underpinnings  of  the  hybrid
mind thesis, the bodily manipulation thesis, and
the transformation thesis as defended by CI. At
the same time, the approach to reading acquisi-
tion put forward in this commentary suggests
that a vast array of empirical findings from cog-
nitive  neuroscience  and  cognitive  psychology
can be unified for the first time by interpreting
them from the new perspective of enculturated
predictive  processing.  Thus,  I  submit  that  we
can  only  appreciate  the  cognitive  assets
rendered possible by our socio-culturally struc-
tured environment once we account for the en-
abling  conditions  of  sophisticated,  neuronally
and bodily realized cognitive processes such as
mathematical cognition and reading. These con-
ditions include socio-culturally established ways
of learning and teaching, LDP, and the ability
to adapt action patterns to the needs and re-
quirements of a certain cognitive task. My over-
all claim is that we need the EPP framework to
be  able  to  approach  the  entire  spectrum  of
these  factors,  whose  complex  interplay  ulti-
mately leads to truly enculturated cognition.
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